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Abstract 
Commonly, established nations are called upon to deal with crime epidemics in developing countries. This is particu‑
larly the case when the outside country has a vested interest in doing something about the foreign nation’s problem. 
One noted example of this is the US funded Plan Colombia operation in South America which targeted organized 
crime and guerrilla groups through the development of the Colombian government’s capacity to carry out direct 
offensive action, with a reported cost of over $8 billion. Yet, efforts by outside countries to establish and professional‑
ize governmental agencies in underdeveloped countries as a means to combat crime epidemics requires an enor‑
mous investment in time and resources, things which are not always feasible. Through a retrospective examination of 
the kidnapping for ransom epidemic which occurred in Colombia, South America throughout the 2000s, this paper 
identifies the potential utility of the crime science approach as a cost effective and more direct strategy to deal with 
crime epidemics in developing countries. Implications and ideas for future applications are discussed.
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Background
Developed nations are often called upon to deal with 
crime epidemics in underdeveloped countries. This is 
particularly the case when the outside country has a 
vested interest in doing something about the foreign 
nation’s problem. This interest may be the result of global 
civic responsibility but it is more likely that the epidemic 
experienced in the developing country has some direct 
and detrimental impact on the established nation(s). Yet 
most preventive programs and policies which take place 
in developed nation states are carried out within polic-
ing and governmental institutions that are comparatively 
well trained, adequately funded, and otherwise profes-
sionalized. For underdeveloped nations this is rarely 
the case. Efforts by outside countries to establish and 
professionalize governmental agencies in underdevel-
oped countries as a means to combat crime epidemics 
requires an enormous investment in time and resources, 
things which are not always feasible.
One noted example of such a scenario was the US backed 
Plan Colombia operation in Latin America which targeted 
organized crime and guerrilla groups who were responsible 
for the kidnapping for ransom epidemic and the illicit nar-
cotics trade. The kidnapping epidemic in Colombia reached 
its apex by 2000 with 3572 incidents compared to just 44 
incidents in 1980 (Moor and Remijnse 2008). After the year 
2000, kidnappings were drastically reduced in Colombia 
ostensibly as a result of the successful implementation of 
Plan Colombia, a U.S.-Colombian joint military effort that 
began in 2000. Originally conceived in the late 1990s as a 
multi-year counter-narcotic, social development and eco-
nomic stability aid package, the events of September 11, 
2011 (9/11) and the “War on Terror” would re-define the 
strategic aims and flexibility of Plan Colombia. Over the 
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12 year period between 2000 and 2012, the United States 
provided over $8 billion1 for Plan Colombia operations, 
with the bulk of the aid, some 80 % focused on counter-nar-
cotics and counterinsurgency (Beittel 2012).
The business of kidnapping and ransom was fine-tuned 
in Colombia, and it is very likely that it has been studied 
and imitated by criminal groups globally. Kidnappings for 
ransom has now become a global industry where an esti-
mated 100,000 incidents occur every year (Christi 2008). 
In fact kidnappings for ransom is now the main funding 
source for Islamic extremist groups in the Arabian Penin-
sula, North Africa, and increasingly war torn Syria and 
Iraq (Knickmeyer 2014). Further, maritime piracy off the 
coast of Somalia has funded Al-Shabab, an Islamic 
extremist group, to some extent (Anyu and Moki 2009). 
Nearly every country identified as experiencing a kidnap-
ping for ransom epidemic (Christi 2008) is considered a 
developing country or a failed state2 and can ill-afford 
multi-billion dollar operations such as Plan Colombia.
This paper identifies the potential utility of the crime 
science approach as a cost effective and more direct strat-
egy to deal with crime epidemics in developing countries. 
The purpose is to provide a discussion, not a deductive 
causal examination, of why and how crime science could 
be a useful approach to tackle crime epidemics such as 
kidnapping for ransom (K&R). To develop this notion, we 
reflect on Colombia’s experience with K&R and utilize the 
FONDELIBERTAD dataset which provides detailed infor-
mation on reported kidnappings in Colombia from 2002 
to 2011, to underscore a few points. We first lay a founda-
tion by reviewing the literature on K&R and then describe 
Plan Colombia in greater depth as it was in operation dur-
ing the years of our dataset. We then discuss the crime 
science framework and identify how it could have been 
used to examine K&R incidents in Colombia in order to 
reduce opportunities which appeared within that K&R 
epidemic. We use the findings from this examination, and 
from previous research (Pires et al. 2014), to reveal how 
the crime science perspective could be useful in address-
ing similar crime problems globally. Either as a tool used 
within large scale development initiatives or relied upon 
solely to target opportunities that enable crime epidemics 
to flourish within underdeveloped countries.
1 Some observers estimate $9 billion was spent on Plan Colombia through 
State Department and Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations 
(est. 2000–2014), but we calculated $8 billion was spent from 2000–
2012. See NY Times article for $9 billion reference: http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/03/10/opinion/hope-for-colombias-peace-process.html
2 Failed states are unable to perform basic functions such as provid-
ing security and education, and therefore, have lost the ability to govern. 
Often, criminal organizations and terrorist groups proliferate in such envi-
ronments further exacerbating the loss of control by a central government 
(Patrick 2007). The Fragile State Index (Fund for Peace 2015) is often used 
to identify failed states, which is based on twelve indicators consisting of 
social, economic, and political measures.
Kidnapping for ransom literature and the 
Colombian context
Some have suggested that K&R offenders have a predisposi-
tion to commit such crimes (for specification of those see 
Marongiu and Clarke 1993) or that K&R is a product of a 
political struggle between the central government, guerrilla 
groups, and militias (Rubio 2004; Topel 2009). However, the 
preponderance of the literature views K&R as a “rational” 
crime (Briggs 2001; Marongiu and Clarke 1993; Michaud 
et al. 2008; Nax 2008; Pires et al. 2014; Tzanelli 2006; Van-
nini et al. 2012; Yang et al. 2007; Yun and Roth 2008). The 
crime is rational because offenders make a cost-benefit cal-
culation that the hostage will be ransomed quickly3 (Maron-
giu and Clarke 1993) and apprehension is unlikely (Briggs 
2001; Christi 2008). Often, extensive planning is involved 
from the preparation stage (i.e. choosing a suitable area, 
time, and target), to the transfer, custody, negotiation, and 
outcome stages (i.e. release or death) (Marongiu and Clarke 
1993). Because many stages are involved in the K&R pro-
cess, even the most opportunistic offenders require some 
planning on where, when, and who will be kidnapped, and 
how they will be handled afterwards (Yang et al. 2007).
Many types of kidnappings exist and recent efforts 
have begun to typologize such variations. According to 
Pharoah (2005), kidnappings can be divided into three 
main categories—political, for ransom, and abductions. 
Along the same lines, Turner (1998) created four catego-
ries consisting of: ransom and political, ransom and not 
political, political and no ransom, not political and no ran-
som. While Turner’s (1998) typology is more comprehen-
sive than the previous one, a variety of kidnappings are 
lumped together under the category of ‘not political and 
no ransom’ which are unrelated to each other (e.g. paren-
tal abduction and kidnapping for rape) (Noor-Mohamed 
2014). The most recent typology of kidnappings is the 
most comprehensive to date and classifies 19 unique types 
of kidnappings and abductions (Noor-Mohamed 2014).
Related to the South American context, there are five types 
of kidnappings for ransom relevant to the present study: (1) 
single; (2) group; (3) express; (4) political; and (5) virtual. Single 
kidnappings involve one person held for ransom while group 
kidnappings involve more than one person. Group kidnap-
pings often occur in rural areas of Colombia where guerrilla 
groups employ a road stop checkpoint and indiscriminately 
kidnap all individuals from their vehicles (Christi 2008). 
Express kidnappings, otherwise known as ATM kidnappings, 
occur when offenders force victims to withdraw as much 
money as possible from ATM machines (Moor and Remijnse 
2008). Express kidnappings incidents do not last very long, 
occur more often in urban areas and are suspected of being 
committed by more inexperienced offenders such as common 
3 Ransom includes political concessions in this context.
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criminals (Moor and Remijnse 2008; Pires et al. 2014). Political 
kidnappings have the ultimate purpose of obtaining political 
concessions or releasing a fellow comrade from imprison-
ment. Typically, such kidnappings are employed by politically 
motivated groups and not common criminals. Finally, virtual 
kidnappings have become a growing phenomenon in Latin 
America where victims are falsely told over the phone a loved 
one has been kidnapped (Moor and Remijnse 2008).
Each type of kidnapping is unique and involves different 
offenders, victims, and methods, while taking place in differ-
ent settings and possibly at different times. The reasons why 
offenders are attracted to committing specific types of kidnap-
pings, also known as the choice structuring properties (Cor-
nish and Clarke 1987), will vary between each other, and this 
variation can explain the popularity of one type of kidnap-
ping over another. Group kidnappings, for example, were the 
most popular type of kidnapping in the 1990s and early 2000s 
within Colombia because of the ease, access to multiple indi-
viduals, potential for multiple ransoms, and the unlikelihood 
of being apprehended by authorities. Each type of kidnapping 
must be analyzed independently from one another to better 
understand patterns of where, when, how, and who is victim-
ized and who is perpetrating the crime (Pires et al. 2014).
Perpetrators of K&R in Colombia are largely limited to four 
groups. The firstNational Liberation Army two groups, the 
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the 
ELN (National Liberation Army), were born out of the after-
math of La Violencia4 and were created to overthrow the 
democratic government in Bogotá. They were both formed in 
the early 1960s as Marxist/Leninist guerrilla forces that oper-
ated in rural Colombia. Both groups began to utilize kidnap-
pings for ransom as an income generating activity around the 
late 1970s, along with the use of extortion, drug taxing and 
trafficking to fund their organization (Beittel 2012). Soon, 
other Colombian organizations began to use the tactic of kid-
napping for ransom along with common criminals. One such 
organization was the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia), a right-wing paramilitary self-defense force that 
practiced extortion, drug trafficking, and ‘dirty war’5 opera-
4 La Violencia was a de facto civil war in Colombia between 1948 and 1958.
5 “Dirty War” comes from the events of the 1960s–1980s during which 
South American (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay) 
military and security forces and right-wing death squads hunted down 
and killed left-wing guerrillas, political dissidents, and anyone believed to 
be associated with socialism. In Colombia, the security forces have been 
accused of aiding right-wing paramilitary groups in numerous dirty war 
operations, such as the Mapiripán Massacre and the El Aro Massacre. 
The Mapiripán took place in Mapiripán, Department of Meta, Colombia 
between July 15 and 20, 1997 with the murder of approximately 30 civil-
ians by AUC paramilitaries . According to intelligence gathered by the US 
Embassy, the Colombian Army provided “travel, logistics, intelligence and 
security” (George Washington University 1997). The El Aro Massacre took 
place in the municipality of Ituango, Department of Antioquia, Colombia. 
15 civilians accused of being leftist supporters of the FARC were murdered 
by the AUC paramilitary group with support from members of the Colom-
bian Army (Revista Semana 2008).
tions on behalf of the Colombian Armed Forces (Miller Llana 
2010). Together, the FARC, ELN, AUC and common crimi-
nals account for over 97 % of known perpetrators of kidnap-
pings since 2002 (Pires et al. 2014).
Plan Colombia and kidnapping for ransom
During the late 1990s the necessity for greater US involve-
ment in Colombia was precipitated on three factors; 
Colombia had become the main source of cocaine enter-
ing the country, Colombia’s democracy was under threat 
from leftist guerillas, and the long-term stability of the 
region was at risk (Rathbone 2012). The Clinton Admin-
istration lobbied the U.S. Congress to support the broader 
Plan Colombia mission and with bipartisan support 
appropriations were authorized. While limited to combat-
ing narcotics production, trafficking, and to a lesser extent 
alternative development, the events of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States had a dramatic 
effect on Plan Colombia’s aims. The Bush administration’s 
declared “War on Terror” found a very enthusiastic part-
ner in the new Colombian president, Alvaro Uribe, in his 
declaration to combat “narco-terrorism”. Soon after Presi-
dent Uribe was sworn into office in August of 2002, the 
U.S. Congress expanded the flexibility of US assistance to 
strengthen Colombia’s fight against terrorism and narcot-
ics (Oehme 2010; Embassy of the United States 2015).
At the end of the 1990s it was clear that to avoid failed 
state status, Colombia’s national security would be 
dependent on the success of Plan Colombia. While the ini-
tial aims of fighting narcotics production and trafficking 
had ancillary effects on the state’s central adversaries, Pres-
ident Uribe’s strategic re-alignment of fighting a war on 
“narco-terrorism” would successfully realize itself in a post 
9/11 environment. No single element can take credit for 
the reduction in the rates of kidnapping and ransom 
(K&R) over the 12 year period between 2000 and 2012, but 
it can be argued that through a combination of Plan 
Colombia funded programs, which included strengthening 
the Colombian security forces’ capacity (air mobility, logis-
tics, increased manpower, superior arms), intelligence 
gathering and dissemination, and training and mentoring 
its special forces in counter terrorism to include anti-kid-
napping6, the environment would become less conducive 
for illegal armed groups (IAGs) and criminal gangs (ban-
das criminales or BACRIM) to successfully engage in K&R 
(Beittel 2012). Non-military assistance was also a key com-
ponent, carried out principally by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) focusing 
6 In 2003, GAULA (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal, 
is the Colombian military’s elite anti-kidnapping unit) and U.S. security 
forces began training together under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Pro-
gram (Santareno 2014).
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on institution building, judicial oversight, and socio-eco-
nomic development in rural areas (Oehme 2010).
Equally, the key strategic decisions taken by Colombian 
leadership that improved security and lowered rates of 
K&R were realized by carrying out military offensives, tar-
geted assassinations of guerilla leaders, eliminating large 
cadres of guerrillas through attrition warfare, disarming 
the paramilitary AUC, and expanding the presence of the 
state in areas that had long been under IAG influence and 
control (Beittel 2012). Through such strategic decisions, 
recent kidnappings totals have been at their lowest levels 
since the early 1980s (Fig. 1). From 2000 to 2011 alone, the 
kidnapping drop amounted to a 91 % decrease.
Countries like Colombia were fortunate to receive sub-
stantial aid to combat terrorist groups that employed 
K&R as a tactic to generate income. However, it is highly 
unlikely countries experiencing similar K&R or other 
crime epidemics will receive such aid. If aid is received, 
it will be comparatively smaller and will likely emanate 
from developed countries’ foreign ministries and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) foreign develop-
ment grants instead of military assistance. Within that 
framework of assistance, the crime science approach can 
be a useful alternative to approaches like Plan Colombia 
where it can target opportunities for crime efficiently and 
effectively where the resources do not permit overhauls 
of governmental capacities. In the case that a large scale 
operation already exists, crime science principles can be 
used in tandem to increase the effectiveness of short- and 
long-term crime reduction objectives.
Crime science framework
The crime science approach (Smith and Tilley 2013), 
with its primary foundation as situational crime preven-
tion (Cornish and Clarke 2003), focuses on understand-
ing the nature and pattern of crime events in an effort 
to identify the underlying opportunities responsible for 
crime concentrations. The approach emanates from the 
opportunity crime theories, that being the routine activi-
ties theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), rational choice the-
ory (Cornish and Clarke 1986), and crime pattern theory 
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1993), which place lit-
tle emphasis on trying to remove criminal dispositions 
and instead focuses on addressing the places, times, and 
victim characteristics which promote offending oppor-
tunities. While criminal dispositions are not focused 
upon, the motivations which drive offenders to commit 
specific crime types are considered insofar as they help 
to identify potential methods for discouraging offending 
through alteration of the situational landscape (Cornish 
and Clarke 1986).
Sociological and political understandings of crime 
epidemics are useful for understanding crime patterns 
on macro levels, but their implications for strategies to 
reduce or prevent crime invariably calls for changing the 
broader societal or political frameworks (often through 
the creation of policies or programs to do so) within 
which the epidemic exists (Levitt and Rubio 2005). While 
these ideas may be valid they are often ambitious, as 
even if they could be accomplished it would take many 
years or generations to achieve along with considerable 
expense. The crime science approach offers a much more 
surgical, micro level strategy to identify crime concentra-
tions and the opportunity structures which facilitate their 
presence, in order to identify immediately actionable pre-
vention activities (Pires et al. 2014).
Critics of the situational approach contend that it fails 
to address the so called root causes for crime since the 
macro level influences may remain unchanged (Young 
2003). While the crime science approach does not 
attempt to influence macro level forces it does offer an 
expedient and efficient way to reduce crime problems 
in the immediate term. The crime science approach may 
also be used in collaboration with the implementation of 
a larger program and policy agenda which seeks to allevi-
ate macro factors over longer periods of time. Yet even 
in the absence of such programs (and the resources to 
carry them out) focusing on situational landscapes can 
result in meaningful and sustainable reductions in crime. 
This is because much crime is caused by the presence 
of easy opportunities and when those opportunities are 
removed some portion of offenders will desist from par-
ticipating in crime altogether (Felson and Clarke 1998). 
Only chronic highly motivated offenders, which make up 
a small proportion of overall offenders, will seek out new 
crimes when faced with blocked opportunities from pre-
vious offending (Guerette 2009).
Another important benefit of the crime science 
approach is that it offers a platform for the efficient 
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Fig. 1 Kidnappings for ransom in Colombia (1980–2011). Source: 
Fondelibertad
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concentrations to which prevention tactics can be tar-
geted and stand to have the greatest impact. It also allows 
for constant reappraisal of shifting or changing crime 
patterns in response to altered opportunity structures in 
order to address the dynamic nature of crime epidemics 
over time. Previous criminological research has clearly 
identified the various ways in which crime tends to clus-
ter, which includes target selection (Cornish and Clarke 
1986), among victims (Pease 1998), among geographic 
areas (Sherman et  al. 1989), across space and time 
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1981), across homog-
enous facility types (Eck et al. 2007), and among offend-
ing populations (Wolfgang and Figlio 1972). While most 
of these crime concentrations have been found among 
conventional domestic crime types (burglary, robbery, 
aggravated assaults, etc.) more recent research apply-
ing the crime science perspective has found similar pat-
terning among a variety of transnational and alternative 
crime types. This includes wildlife crime (Lemieux 2014; 
Lemieux and Clarke 2009; Pires and Clarke 2012; Petros-
sian and Clarke 2014; Petrossian 2015; Petrossian et  al. 
2015), terrorism (Behlendorf et al. 2012; Braithwaite and 
Johnson 2015; Freilich and Newman 2009; Gibbs 2010), 
maritime piracy (Marchione and Johnson 2013; Shane 
and Magnuson 2014), migrant deaths (Guerette 2007), 
cybercrime (Hinduja and Kooi 2013) and identity theft 
(White and Fisher 2008).
One recent study, a precursor to the effort here, 
applied the situational crime prevention framework to 
kidnappings for ransom in Colombia, South America in 
an attempt to determine whether aggregated incidents 
of kidnappings revealed patterns that would support 
the appropriateness of future applications of the situ-
ational crime prevention framework to identify oppor-
tunities for prevention (Pires et  al. 2014). The idea was 
that if concentrations and other patterns existed among 
incidents of kidnappings for ransom which are simi-
lar to those found in commonly studied crime types, 
then much more could be done to systematically pre-
vent kidnappings and other crime epidemics in devel-
oping countries globally. The findings revealed several 
concentrations among the kidnapped sample which 
occurred in Colombia over nearly a decade. The con-
centrations were found to be pronounced geographi-
cally, temporally, across victim types and across offender 
groups. In the current study we extend those previous 
findings by assessing further the utility of the crime 
science approach as an efficient and effective method 
for addressing crime epidemics in developing nations. 
While the previous study (Pires et  al. 2014) identified 
aggregated concentrations and potential opportuni-
ties for prevention, the focus here is to assess whether 
these patterns changed over time thereby necessitating 
the continued application of a crime science approach to 
guide and refine prolonged prevention tactics.
Data
The study utilized data from the Fondo Nacional para la 
Defensa de la Libertad Personal (National Fund for the 
Protection of Individual Liberty), a Colombian govern-
mental organization known in short as FONDELIBER-
TAD. FONDELIBERTAD was established in 1996 by law 
and has been responsible for collecting detailed informa-
tion on kidnappings since 2002.7 All information is 
reported to the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the 
legal mandate of the program ended in 2011. Thus, all 
reported victims of kidnappings that occurred between 
January 1st, 2002 and December 31st, 2011 are included 
in the dataset. Additional data were collected for each 
incident pertaining to when, where, who (both victim 
and perpetrator), duration in captivity and the outcome 
of each event. Concerning locations of crime, events were 
documented by locale (i.e. urban or rural) and to two dif-
ferent administrative jurisdictions of Colombian depart-
ments (n  =  32) and municipalities (n  =  1120). As 
Colombia is a unitary republic, departments are similar 
to ‘states’ in the United States. Departments are formed 
by a grouping of municipalities, which are the smallest 
administrative unit of analysis, similar to counties within 
the United States.
ArcGIS software was utilized to aggregate incidents to 
administrative units such as departments and municipal-
ities so that spatial variation can be examined. Recoding 
the ‘occupations’ of kidnapped victims is a necessity in 
understanding victimization risk. Common occupation 
types had similar jobs grouped together (see Pires et al. 
2014). Separate analyses are required for examining the 
frequency for the three subtypes of kidnappings (express, 
group, and political)8 occurring in Colombia (Pires et al. 
2014). Express kidnappings are poorly documented in 
our dataset as research has found many such kidnappings 
are recorded as robberies instead (Christi 2008). There-
fore, we defined express kidnappings as the proportion of 
victims who were taken captive for 0–1 days. This defini-
tion would include K&R incidents that were express in 
nature as well as incidents that resulted in ransoms being 
paid very quickly. Group kidnapping information was not 
included in the data set, so we codified group kidnap-
pings by identifying victims that were taken by the same 
criminal actor and occurring on the same day and in the 
same municipality (Pires et  al. 2014). Political kidnap-
pings, unlike the other subtypes of kidnappings, are 
7 FONDLIBERTAD also provides legal and psychological assistance to fam-
ilies affected by kidnappings and advises the government on K&R policies.
8 No data is provided on virtual kidnappings as no kidnapping actually 
occurred.
Page 6 of 11Stubbert et al. Crime Sci  (2015) 4:23 
documented in the dataset accurately and thus require no 
recoding.
Of the few studies that have utilized the FONDELIB-
ERTAD dataset (Rubio 2004; Di Tella et al. 2010; Pshisva 
and Suarez 2010), none have mentioned reporting or 
accuracy issues. Often, reported crime data suffers from 
selectivity bias. Some areas or groups of individuals may 
be less likely to report crime due to a variety of reasons. 
While this may hold true in Colombia, no evidence docu-
ments selectivity bias in reporting crime in the Colom-
bian context. One issue with the FONDELIBERTAD 
dataset that has been mentioned is the lack of clarity 
on how kidnapped victims are counted. Outsiders have 
claimed that the numbers in captivity had vastly changed 
between a 2 year period suggesting that the methodologi-
cal criteria had suddenly changed or the data had been 
purposefully manipulated for political purposes (Revista 
Semana 2010). As a result of FONDELIBERTAD organi-
zation no longer existing, we do not know why there were 
discrepancies in kidnapping incidents numbers between 
two different time periods.
Applying crime science to the problem of K&R
Geographic distribution
We use location, time, perpetrator and victim informa-
tion to identify patterns of K&R incidents in three dif-
ferent time periods (2002, 2006, 2011). Figure 2 presents 
municipalities where victims of K&R have been targeted 
in Colombia. Not all municipalities have experienced a 
kidnapping. Of the municipalities that have experienced 
a kidnapping, a small proportion account for the major-
ity of K&R victims (Fig.  3). For example, in 2002, 20  % 
of municipalities account for 88  % of K&R victims. By 
2011, just 12  % of municipalities account for 100  % of 
K&R victims. Over time, K&R occurred less often and 
became more concentrated in fewer municipalities. In 
examining the spatial changes over the three time peri-
ods, it’s evident that both persistent and temporary hot 
areas exist (Fig.  2). An example of a persistent hot area 
is the municipality of Cundinamarca, which includes the 
city of Bogotá. This hot area has consistently experienced 
a high concentration of kidnappings in all three periods. 
Though there is also evidence of temporary hot areas in 
Colombia as many municipalities that experienced kid-
nappings in 2002 no longer did in 2011. For instance, 115 
victims were kidnapped in Valledupar in 2002, but no 
victims were reported in this municipality in 2011. 
Descriptive statistics on K&R incidents
Table  1 gives further information on patterns of K&R 
over time by examining the characteristics of incidents. 
The majority of K&R victims (72 %) in 2002 were targeted 
in rural areas of Colombia as most victims were part of 
group kidnappings (57 %) at that time. Once the military 
established law and order in rural Colombia, the popular-
ity of group kidnappings decreased after 2002 and with it 
overall kidnappings perpetrated by guerrilla groups and 
militias. As a result, urban areas became the setting for 
most kidnappings, and common criminals were the lead-
ing perpetrators by 2011. Common criminals most fre-
quently operate from within urban areas in major cities 
such as Bogotá, Medellin, and Cali (Fig. 2).
Victim demographics shifted as well. Approximately 
23  % of individuals under the age of 18 were targeted 
Fig. 2 The spatial concentration of kidnappings for ransom in Colombia (2002, 2006, 2011)
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in 2002, but slowly declined to 14 % by 2011 (Table 1). 
This decline was offset by an increase of kidnappings in 
the 18–30 age group. Targeted occupations were busi-
nessmen, professionals, and minors, though fluctuation 
between periods are evident. Businessmen and univer-
sity students experienced significant increases between 
2002 and 2011. This increase may be a consequence of 
kidnappings occurring more often in urban areas where 
most universities are located and many more business-
men may reside. Other occupations, such as agricultural 
and tradesmen, experienced fluctuations between peri-
ods. In 2006, tradesmen, such as drivers and carriers, 
were twice as likely to be kidnapped compared to 2002 
figures.
Temporal distribution
Temporal analysis is limited to days of the week and 
months as no specific time is recorded for these inci-
dents. More individuals were kidnapped in the begin-
ning of the week in the years 2002 and 2011. Although in 
2006, K&R occurred more often between Thursday and 
Saturday. Interestingly, Sunday consistently experienced 
a lower than average number of kidnappings in all three 
time periods. This may be the result of Colombian tra-
dition to spend time with family and extended family at 
home on Sundays instead of traveling within cities and 
outside of cities (Discover Colombia 2015). As a result, 
the opportunity to kidnap individuals on Sundays is less 
likely as fewer people are outside. Analysis of monthly 
data alludes to unique hot times in each time period. 
Each hot period lasts about 2–3 months. In 2002, it was 
April, May, and June; in 2006, August and September; 
and in 2011, May, June, and July.
Geographic distribution of FARC kidnappings
Data can be further disaggregated by perpetrator groups 
to identify unique patterns that could aid law enforce-
ment strategy. One such way is to map incidents by each 
perpetrator over time as illustrated in Fig.  4 with the 
FARC. The FARC had been the leading perpetrator of 
kidnappings in Colombia for over three decades. In 2011, 
the FARC was responsible for less than half of the kid-
nappings common criminals conducted (Table 1). A 92 % 
decrease in FARC-perpetrated kidnappings occurred 
between 2002 and 2011 and this dramatic reduction 
is also seen geographically (Fig.  4). In 2002, the FARC 
kidnapped at least one individual from 258 municipali-
ties, but by 2011, their kidnappings were reduced to 46 
municipalities. In 2011, FARC kidnappings had virtually 
disappeared in northern Colombia and instead occurred 
in central and south-west Colombia, possibly reflecting 
shifting strongholds of the guerrilla organization.
Discussion
The crime science approach can improve efficiency since 
it is able to identify the multiple concentrations in which 
problem behavior occurs thereby allowing for the most 
effective delivery of tactics within a prevention strategy. 
For small scale crime problems, such as street corner hot-
spots, an initial analysis is usually sufficient to orient pre-
vention activities and bring the problem under control. 
For large-scale problems, such as crime epidemics, the 
continued analysis and understanding of shifting patterns 
of opportunity structures will be necessary as national 
level epidemics are more dynamic than micro-level con-
centrations and perhaps change more readily as strate-





































Fig. 3 The inequality of kidnappings across Colombian municipalities in 2002 (left panel) and 2011 (right panel). We plotted the cumulative percent‑
age of kidnappings across municipalities (1–1120) against the cumulative percentage of total municipalities for two separate years. If kidnappings 
were evenly distributed throughout each and every municipality, the observed line (dotted) would run parallel with the line of equality (45‑degree 
angle). If, however, the observed line (dotted) deviates significantly from the line of equality, then kidnappings are highly concentrated in just a small 
percentage of municipalities. In both years, kidnappings significantly deviate from the line of equality
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the crime science approach could prove useful to guide 
and refine prolonged prevention tactics.
The opportunity for kidnapping and ransom to prolif-
erate is dependent on weak government authority and 
institutions. Preventing K&R is often up to foreign aid 
organizations and NGOs. These outside groups are key 
in carrying out the necessary data collection and inves-
tigative process to confront the epidemic. Foreign grant 
money can also be contingent on meeting these requi-
sites. Security forces, be they military or police, might 
also be asked to follow similar obligations in order to 
obtain anti-kidnapping foreign aid. The situational crime 
prevention approach could also be strengthened by utiliz-
ing collaborative partnerships across sectors, to include 
intergovernmental, NGOs, corporations, and community 
foundations/groups. The convergence of knowledge, 
transparency, accountability, and mutual will to tackle 
the problem could increase the probability of success. 
In order for the crime problem to be targeted using the 
situational crime prevention (SCP) approach, patterns 
of a crime problem must be identified and understood. 
Through data collection and analysis, the SCP process 
allows policy makers and law enforcement to strategically 
target crime incidents (see Pires et al. 2014).
The present analysis of K&R incidents in Colombia 
reveals different patterns of concentrations in each year 
examined in relation to space, time, type, victims, and 
perpetrators. Up to date data analysis and crime maps 
could foster more effective policing strategy, such as 
Problem-Oriented Policing (Braga 2008) or “hot spot” 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics on K&R incidents (2002, 2006, 2011)
a The AUC no longer existed after 2006. However, many of its members became part of the BACRIM organization years later
b Express kidnappings are rarely identified in the database. Instead, we examine the proportion of kidnappings that last up to 1 day as a proxy measure for express 
kidnappings (Pires et al. 2014)
2002 2006 2011 2002 2006 2011
Setting Victim gender
Rural 72.4 44.4 32.5 Female 20.6 24.1 18.4
Urban 27.6 54.3 66.9 Male 79.4 75.9 81.6
Top 4 perpetrators Victim age (known)
FARC 34.2 17.6 25.2 Under 18 22.7 18.9 13.8
ELN 28.1 9.6 11.1 18–30 16.3 20.6 26.3
Common criminal 14.5 39.2 59.0 31–50 42.0 38.7 38.4
AUC/BACRIMa 5.8 1.5 4.6 51+ 19.0 21.8 21.5
Type Day of week
Group kidnapping % 56.7 26.1 24.6 Monday 17.5 13.9 16.1
Express (0–1 days)b 33.2 43.2 34.1 Tuesday 16.7 12.3 14.4
Political 4.0 0.0 0.0 Wednesday 13.6 12.9 16.1
Thursday 13.2 15.8 15.7
Friday 13.5 16.0 13.1
Victim occupation Saturday 14.1 15.8 13.1
Agriculture 5.9 12.2 9.5 Sunday 11.5 13.2 11.5
Businessman 12.4 14.9 29.2
Employee of company 6.8 8.3 6.2 Month
Govt official 6.1 4.1 3.0 January 6.9 8.0 8.9
House wife 1.5 3.2 2.3 February 6.1 9.3 5.6
Law enforcement/military 1.9 0.1 1.3 March 7.5 8.0 9.5
Minor 12.5 15.8 12.1 April 10.3 8.4 7.2
Other 0.8 0.3 5.6 May 10.6 9.3 15.1
Politician 0.1 0.0 1.0 June 10.4 8.4 11.1
Professional 9.8 10.0 12.1 July 8.6 6.5 10.8
Retiree 1.1 1.0 0.7 August 9.8 11.5 9.8
Student 2.0 2.9 8.5 September 7.3 10.9 5.2
Tourist 1.1 0.7 0.0 October 7.3 8.1 4.3
Tradesman 6.3 13.6 8.2 November 7.1 7.0 8.5
Unknown 31.7 12.7 0.3 December 8.3 4.6 3.9
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policing (Braga 2005), as resources can be targeted in 
areas and times where K&R is disproportionately occur-
ring. The findings of this paper suggest that K&R is 
concentrated in a small percentage of Colombian munici-
palities and occur slightly more often in the summer 
months. Some individuals are at higher risk, namely older 
males who are businessmen or professionals; although 
shifts in occupational risk are noticeable between time 
periods.
Protecting high risk victims could involve alerting and 
educating particular individuals, targeted media aware-
ness campaigns, encouraging expanding citizen-insti-
gated alert systems that utilize roadway alarms and/or 
cell phone text messaging, such as an Amber Alert (Flo-
res 2014), building coalitions with governmental, edu-
cational, corporate and transportation groups to aid in 
modifying policies and practices to reduce kidnapping 
risks, and establishing GPS loaner systems (Pires et  al. 
2014). These methods would extend guardianship, as well 
as strengthen formal surveillance (Cornish and Clarke 
2003).
Methods for targeting offenders by utilizing the SCP 
process could include implementing tip line rewards 
leading to the liberation of a victim (i.e. assisting natural 
surveillance), broadening prosecution beyond individual 
offenders to include groups so criminal gangs as a whole 
are prosecuted (i.e. removal of excuses), and facilitating 
greater employment opportunities to at-risk communi-
ties prone to joining criminal gangs (i.e. neutralize peer 
pressure and disrupt markets) (Pires et al. 2014).
Several approaches employing the SCP process at 
the spatial level to target kidnapping could also include 
greater resources from national and international aid 
budgets to the high-risk areas. Such interventions could 
include utilizing CCTV, barriers, aerial drones (UAVs), 
defensible space designs along with improved street light-
ing/visibility, and targeted patrols on roadways. These 
methods would strengthen natural and formal surveil-
lance, and target harden public spaces (Pires et al. 2014).
Analyzing the types of kidnappings occurring at a given 
time could further aid policing strategy. In the early years 
of our dataset, group kidnappings had been the most 
popular method as military and law enforcement pres-
ence was absent in the majority of rural areas of Colom-
bia. The decline in group kidnappings was not offset by 
an increase in other types of kidnappings, such as express 
kidnappings, but led to overall reductions in all kidnap-
pings. The fact that displacement did not occur spa-
tially or to other targets (Clarke and Eck 2005; Guerette 
and Bowers 2009) suggests offenders were highly reliant 
on particular opportunities that made groups kidnap-
pings highly attractive. Once the government was able to 
reduce kidnappings in rural areas by guerrilla groups and 
militias, the kidnapping problem shifted to traditional 
urban kidnappings predominantly conducted by com-
mon criminals.
Limitations of our analysis serve as a reminder of the 
type of data that is needed to have the greatest effect on 
crime reductions. Our analysis was limited to aggregat-
ing data to the smallest administrative units of analysis, 
which are municipalities in Colombia. Geo-coding inci-
dents to physical addresses or geo-coordinates is more 
optimal, as hot-spot density maps could be created to 
identify micro hot spots (Braga et  al. 2010; Groff et  al. 
Fig. 4 Location of kidnappings by the FARC in the years 2002, 2006, and 2011
Page 10 of 11Stubbert et al. Crime Sci  (2015) 4:23 
2010; Yang 2010) within municipalities such as a neigh-
borhood, major road, or even a precise location where 
kidnappings have re-occurred in the past. Temporal anal-
yses of K&R incidents should also examine the precise 
time of day, as crime research shows substantial variation 
throughout the day (Felson and Poulsen 2003). Even if 
data cannot be obtained for the exact time of an incident, 
start time and date and an end time and date would prove 
useful for police units. Collecting such data can enable 
‘aoristic analysis’ of kidnapping events, which “generates 
a crime occurrence probability at any given time that can 
be mapped or visualized graphically” (Ratcliffe 2002, p. 
23). Future research should gather intelligence on spe-
cific places and times which could further guide policing 
efforts to focus on hot-spots at hot times minimizing the 
probability of future incidents. In addition, practitioners 
should apply situational crime prevention interventions 
to crime epidemics in developing nations and evaluate if 
and how interventions were able to reduce crime and if 
displacement was evident.
Conclusions
Kidnappings for ransom is a growing problem in the 
world that is fueling guerrilla and terrorist movements 
from the FARC in Colombia, to Al-Qaeda in Mali and 
Yemen (Forest 2012; Nossiter 2012), and ISIL/ISIS in 
Syria (CBS News 2014). Al-Qaeda and its affiliated 
organizations, for example, have been extremely success-
ful using this tactic, acquiring at least $125 million since 
2008 (Callimachi 2014). Colombia was fortunate enough 
to avoid becoming a failed state in large part to the US 
backed Plan Colombia operation. Though most countries 
with serious crime problems will not be as fortunate to 
receive billions of dollars in aid from another country in 
the form of military assistance. Moreover, reforming and 
modernizing the criminal justice apparatus in a develop-
ing country is extremely challenging. Crises such as the 
K&R epidemics that are flourishing in nations mentioned 
above require immediate action. In such cases, nations 
could be prudent in using a crime science perspective to 
identify patterns of crime concentration as it relates to 
space, time, targets, offenders, and victims. In doing so, 
specific crimes can be immediately reduced without cost-
ing nations a tremendous amount of money or political 
capital.
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